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Abstract
This paper examines the relevance of both efﬁciency-based and learning-based net-
work behaviour in the context of inter-ﬁrm partnering. The effect of these differ-
ent forms of network behaviour on company performance is analyzed for companies
in the international computer industry. Strategies associated with learning through
so-called exploratory networks appear to generate a greater impact on technologi-
cal performance in a dynamic environment than efﬁciency strategies through
exploitative networks.
Descriptors: networks, learning, technological performance
Introduction
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the behaviour of companies in
the context of their speciﬁc network-ties with other companies in a dynamic
industrial network setting. We expect particular network behaviours to
enable some companies to develop new knowledge that allows them to
achieve higher performance than other network players. Our research fol-
lows some recent developments in academic work on networks (Burt 1992
a and b; Freeman 1979; Powell et al. 1996; Walker et al. 1997) where the
attention paid to the strategic behaviour of network players coincides with
a refocusing of research from the traditional laboratory setting or a purely
theoretical approach to empirical research. This increase in empirical net-
work analysis affects the current management and organization literature
that focuses on the effect of inter-company networks on company perfor-
mance. According to some, the practical and strategic implications of recent
empirical network analysis might even go as far as offering ‘... a manual
for those wishing to optimize their instrumental networks ...’ (Andrews
1995: 355) in a concrete business setting. However, our contribution has
not only practical implications. The main research questions guiding our
empirical analysis are based on the theoretical understanding of two dif-
ferent perspectives on the network behaviour of companies.
In the following, we will refer to these two different network perspectives as
alternative approaches, where efﬁciency and learning are placed in the context


























525 Authors namevis à vis other players. The expected higher performance of strategic players,
then, is linked to their ability to access information about rewarding opportu-
nities through network behaviour that is based on either maximum efﬁciency
in setting up network-ties or based on learning through multiple contacts with
a number of companies. This debate about the rationale of networks, the role
of information and their effect on performance clearly ﬁts in the tradition of
social network analysis inﬂuenced by the seminal work of Granovetter (1973),
where ‘weak ties‘ in networks serve as bridges that can help to transfer infor-
mation from one group of players to another.
One of the implications of our critical evaluation of modern network
analysis is that we will qualify some of its instrumentalist suggestions. In
our opinion, concrete advice based on applied network analysis in a
market environment can easily lead to some misleading suggestions for
the network strategies of companies, unless proper attention is paid to
the environmental and behavioural conditions of networks. The main
point we are making below is that in a dynamic environment, learning
through multiple contacts with some quasi-redundancy, will be more
effective than following strict maximizing rules for the efﬁciency of net-
works, for instance through a preference for so-called non-redundant con-
tacts. This discussion of different forms of rationality in network behaviour,
that we refer to as efﬁciency-based network behaviour versus learning-
based network behaviour, returns to the classical discussion on the role of
improved information ﬂows through increasing contacts that come with
higher ‘gregariousness’ (Erbe 1962). Under conditions of increased gre-
gariousness, which implies an increasing number of contacts between par-
ticipants, the ﬂow of information also increases. This approach emphasizes
improved information ﬂows through repeated ties with a number of part-
ners, instead of efﬁciency improvement by means of non-redundant
contacts.
Following suggestions by, among others, Burkhardt and Brass (1990), this
paper focuses on the level of inter-organizational networks, more in par-
ticular on companies, their interrelationships, and their performance in
terms of their learning achievements through networks. Traditionally, net-
work analysis was mainly applied to study inter-personal networks, how-
ever, recent contributions to the study of inter-organizational relationships
have introduced a network perspective, using standard network measures,
to understand the development of groups of companies and individual com-
panies in a competitive environment. Comparing different forms of net-
working behaviour, we complement this recent research in which the
diversity in the network portfolio of companies, through their range of ties
to other companies, is placed at the centre of empirical research (Burt 1992a
and b; Duysters and Vanhaverbeke 1996; Gulati 1995a; Mowery et al. 1997;
Powell et al. 1996; Walker et al. 1997; Zaheer and Zaheer 1997). More
speciﬁcally, we will analyze the inter-ﬁrm networks of strategic technol-
ogy alliances through which companies acquire and develop R&D-related
knowledge that will help them to differentiate their technological perfor-
mance from other companies. 
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analysis from both an efﬁciency and a learning perspective, leading to the
basic hypotheses to be tested in this paper. In the following section, we
explain the general model and the set of variables used in this study and
report on the data set and population of companies studied. We chose the
international computer industry to analyze the effect of different network
strategies on the technological performance of companies. After reporting on
the results of our investigation, we discuss our ﬁndings and draw some con-
clusions in terms of the possible implications of different network behaviours
for learning and the technological performance of companies.
Theoretical Perspectives on Inter-ﬁrm Networks
An Efﬁciency Perspective on Networks
Social network analysis has been developed through various models using
laboratory settings, scenarios and small number experiments. Many of these
models feature some rather strong, assumptions about the efﬁciency of max-
imizing behaviour by network players. These assumptions show a remark-
able resemblance to the economic ‘textbook’ maximizing understanding of
economic subjects with perfect knowledge and complete information about
market transactions. As in economic theory, there is a recent increase in
the number of advanced, theoretical studies that focus on the role of incom-
plete information (Willer 1992).
Translated to companies and their networks, such ‘textbook’ examples of
maximizing assumptions still found in a large part of social network analy-
sis are:
  companies (players) in a network setting are expected to have complete and
accurate information about all network linkage.
  companies comprehend and apply the principles of network power, which
implies that they are very selective and efﬁcient in choosing partners (see,
e.g., Leik 1992).
Given these maximizing or efﬁciency assumptions, it is not necessarily
rational or valuable for a company to simply increase the number of its
‘dyadic’ linkages within an existing network. Being linked to companies
that carry interesting information, and that play a crucial role in an over-
all set of network linkages, is expected to be more valuable than just being
part of a dense network. In other words, there is diminishing utility of added
linkages in general, whereas there is an increasing utility for adding the
‘right’ kind of linkages. 
Based on such behavioural assumptions, participants with a low network
participation will prefer to add new links to their existing network, whereas
central players choose to delete as many duplicating links as possible.
Linking up to well-positioned companies with a high ‘network status’ is
also thought to be more valuable than just being linked to others in a
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ages, through which major players change the potential of their position,
is a crucial element in most contributions to the theory of network analy-
sis (Leik 1992). 
In organization- and management-related studies of networks, these past
developments in network theory have stimulated a further search for
improved network analysis that should go beyond a straightforward eval-
uation of network positioning (Salancik 1995). Apart from theoretical
research on the implications of different network structures for the inter-
actions within networks, empirical research related to recent developments
in network theory concentrates on the individual company perspective, with
some network positions generating better access to information and better
results, with fewer constraints than others.
The recent work by Burt (1992 a, b) is one of the more inﬂuential contri-
butions, which is also a good example of the current efﬁciency-based
approach in network analysis. Central to this approach is the already well
accepted idea in ‘traditional’ network analysis that the size of a speciﬁc
network of a strategic player as such is not very important for the adequate
transfer of information. What really counts is the number of non-redundant
contacts, because it is assumed that redundant contacts carry the same infor-
mation. By deﬁnition, dense networks involve a considerable degree of
interaction between companies and many of these interactions are expected
to be redundant and inefﬁcient. 
The argument is taken further by stressing that strategic players (compa-
nies) should aim at having non-redundant contacts or ‘structural holes’ that
are additive and not merely overlapping. A strategic player can create an
efﬁcient network by focusing resources on the maintenance of ‘bridge ties’
that overarch structural holes with as little redundancy as possible. In stan-
dard network analysis terminology this implies that the structural equiva-
lence of strategic players in the network (the degree of interaction with the
same players) and the cohesion in strategic players’ networks (the connec-
tivity of players) should be limited, if they are to beneﬁt from their con-
tacts. In addition, linking up to other players that have a high degree of
network status, as they are well positioned in the network, is important for
the transfer of information.
In terms of the current social network terminology, the implications of an
efﬁciency framework for understanding the beneﬁts for strategic players
are as follows:
  It is beneﬁcial for companies to get access to existing information through a
limited number of diverse contacts (bridges), avoiding dense inefﬁcient net-
works. This line of reasoning is based on classical arguments such as, for
instance, those found in Granovetter (1973), where the importance of so-called
‘weak ties’ are demonstrated, because they serve as bridges that can help to
transfer information from one group of social players to another.
  Companies should avoid duplicating existing contacts; they should create
well-informed and selective linkages that generate so-called structural auton-
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alence should be small). According to Burt (1992a), for example, the lower
the number of structurally equivalent ﬁrms that a company faces, the more
effective is a ﬁrm’s network strategy.
  Having access to information and being linked to others with high network
status makes a company a suitable partner for others (network status should
be high). This is in line with the arguments of Podolny (1994) and Podolny
and Baron (1996), who argue that the status of players in a network is an
important factor in the network performance of companies.
The technical implications of the above, in terms of the variables for network
analysis, are discussed in the section ‘Methodology and Data’.
A Learning Perspective on Networks
An alternative approach for understanding network behaviour, that we
would like to put forward here, assumes that companies experiment with
and learn from their contacts, without following strict rules of efﬁciency
maximization. This learning approach shares a number of aspects of its crit-
icism of efﬁciency assumptions with behavioural theory (Simon 1956,
1987; Cyert and March 1964) and evolutionary economics (Nelson and
Winter 1982). A central element in these alternative approaches is the con-
cept of ‘bounded rationality’, with companies demonstrating a satisﬁcing
behaviour under conditions of imperfect knowledge. Also, the attention for
topics such as routinized behaviour and learning runs contrary to more
orthodox approaches that explain the behaviour of companies in the light
of efﬁciency and rational choices that lead to an optimization of decision
rules.
This approach also parallels some of the work in evolutionary economics
that stresses the positive effect of learning behaviour on company perfor-
mance in a dynamic context. For instance, Silverberg and Verspagen (1994,
1996) found that, in a world of technological change, ﬁrms do not neces-
sarily demonstrate short-term optimal, efﬁcient behaviour. Instead, a long-
term, learning-oriented behaviour was found to generate higher returns.
Allen’s (1988) analysis also shows that, in a dynamic economic environ-
ment, learning through various contacts pays off, as this behaviour can out-
perform short-term maximizing behaviour that only concentrates on the
efﬁciency of information transfer in existing contacts. This attention paid
to the importance of learning, particularly in a dynamic, technologically
sophisticated, environment is reﬂected in a growing body of literature on
alliances, learning and industry development (e.g. Ciborra 1991; Osborn
and Hagedoorn 1997; Oster 1992; Powell et al. 1996).
Also, the literature on the learning behaviour of companies (and individu-
als) reveals that a dynamic environment with frequently changing condi-
tions encourages continuous learning by companies. Environmental change
and exposure to new ideas is expected to extend the existing knowledge
base of companies, improve their existing learning capabilities and, more
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1989; March 1991). As suggested by, amongst others, Barkema and
Vermeulen (1998), cooperation between companies in changing environ-
ments helps companies to learn different ways of doing things; it gener-
ates new ideas and new practices that create incentives for innovative
behaviour that further enhances their technological capabilities.
To continue along this line of argument, we suggest that, in a dynamic envi-
ronment, with rapid technological development or frequent structural
changes in the market, the relevance of continuous learning by companies
increases. In the case of rapid technological change, there is immanent
uncertainty about future technological development (Dosi et al. 1988). It
will be difﬁcult for companies to assess which company or group of com-
panies will be the ﬁrst to master and develop new technologies, or who
will be the main carriers of new innovations. This lack of clarity regard-
ing the role of major players seems to be present particularly in advanced
sectors, where new designs are frequently developed by new players (Wade
1996). Research so far also suggests that the introduction of new designs
fosters new market niches occupied by a mixture of older companies and
new ones, where the role of new players remains somewhat unclear for
some time (Dosi et al. 1988; Duysters 1996, Hagedoorn 1989; Sahal 1981).
Concentrating only on those companies that can provide information on
existing, fully developed, technologies might result in missing unexpected
opportunities. Entering into a relationship with a well-established player
with a high network status and technological credibility is important for
the transfer of established knowledge, but this is not necessarily relevant
in the quest for new knowledge that is central to new technological devel-
opments.
This kind of argument also applies to structural changes in the market, where
entry from new companies, international competitors and diversifying com-
panies can change the competitive space for an existing group of compa-
nies. The efﬁciency of information transfer through bridges in existing
networks and avoiding duplication of contacts will become less relevant
within these changing market environments (Yamaguchi 1994). 
For learning behaviour in inter-ﬁrm networks in an environment of tech-
nological change, it seems much more important for companies to build a
relationship with various players with whom they can jointly develop new
technological knowledge. A number of studies reveal that multiple contacts
over a number of years can help companies build inter-organizational trust
(Gulati 1995b; Heide and Miner 1992; Kogut 1989; Nooteboom et al. 1997;
Saxton 1997). This literature suggests that shared experiences with several
contacts encourages companies to add new dimensions to their collabora-
tion. Joint technological development can certainly be seen as an impor-
tant aspect of further collaboration between companies, which also exposes
the partners to new ideas, enhances their innovative behaviour and improves
their technological capabilities. 
The argument we are making boils down to the following: in a dynamic
environment characterized by technological change and ‘openness’ of
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contacts is preferable to efﬁciency-based behaviour. Dynamic environments
require intensive, exploratory learning (Dodgson 1993; March 1991) for
which companies can use a diversity of links to particular companies with-
out maximizing the efﬁciency of their overall network ties. In a dynamic
environment, the current network status of companies is not an accurate
predictor of their potential future inﬂuence and the network itself ﬂuctuates,
such that there is no clear deﬁnition, even, of the set of potential partners.
Learning-based behaviour implies that, under conditions of change, the
value of a particular tie or number of ties, between players might be
unknown or difﬁcult to estimate at the start of the collaboration. In search-
ing for valuable contacts, reducing redundancy is not a priority if com-
panies intend to learn from a variety of sources through the network in
which they are operating. For instance, Gomes-Casseres (1996) points at
the positive effect that the intentional duplication of contacts between
participants in networks might have for improving their learning capa-
bilities. Over time, a successful tie-up might develop information that
was unknown at its initial stage. The value of the information and the value
of the process of exploratory learning that goes with establishing different
tie-ups to other companies cannot be estimated beforehand. Also, it is
impossible to gauge in advance exactly which network pattern would
generate the highest returns for a company. In-depth studies of the impor-
tance of multiple ties in high-tech industries, such as the computer indus-
try, can be found in Duysters and Vanhaverbeke (1996), Gomes-Casseres
(1996), and Hagedoorn et al. (2001). These studies demonstrate the rele-
vance of these multiple ties, not just for information transfer, but particu-
larly for joint learning experiences regarding new technologies and new
opportunities.
Based on our understanding of these alternative network perspectives, pre-
sented above, we formulate two basic hypotheses that will guide our
research: 
H1: In a dynamic environment, there is a positive relationship between the
degree to which companies demonstrate a learning-based network behav-
iour and their performance.
H2: In a dynamic environment, efﬁciency-based network behaviour by com-
panies is expected to have no effect on their performance.
These hypotheses could also be related to a set of sub-hypotheses, in terms
of the different operationalizations of network behaviour and the expected
effects, and their signs, as presented in Table 1, below. However, unless
the particular statistical indicator is clariﬁed, see the next section, some
technical aspects of measuring network variables make it somewhat difﬁ-
cult to explain the expected effects and their values. Therefore, we prefer
to test two basic hypotheses in the statistical analysis by using a set of sev-
eral network indicators.
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Population
In the following, we will study the effects of efﬁciency-based behaviour
and learning-based behaviour on company performance in the context of
networks of strategic technology alliances, with joint R&D and other shared
innovative efforts. These strategic technology alliances, through which
companies acquire R&D-related knowledge, are expected to help them dif-
ferentiate their technological performance from other companies. The rel-
evance of this topic, as for instance demonstrated by the growing
importance of strategic technology alliances as a major element in the exter-
nal linkages of companies, has been documented in many publications. See
Hagedoorn (1996) and Osborn and Hagedoorn (1997) for an overview of
the literature.
Given the emphasis on ‘technology’alliances, their effect will not be related
to economic performance in general, but to the technological performance
of companies. However, this technological performance of companies is
expected to be dependent not only on the networking characteristics of com-
panies, but also on some ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics or endogenous capa-
bilities. In that context, one has to think of the size of companies that
captures scale and scope effects and R&D efforts that might generate tech-
nological performance differentials. 
Our empirical analysis covers the industrial, technological and networking
activity of companies operating in the international computer industry.
There are 88 companies in our analysis (see Appendix 2), these companies
represent over 80 percent of the sales of the worldwide computer industry.
There are several reasons for choosing this particular industry and its net-
work of strategic technology alliances. The computer industry is known to
be a high-tech sector that creates a dynamic environment for companies
(OECD 1992). It is a large, competitive and technologically advanced sec-
tor with a high R&D intensity of over 10 percent (OECD 1997). It is an
industry where one ﬁnds a large number of strategic technology alliances
that play an important role in the competitive strategies of companies (see,
amongst others, Duysters and Hagedoorn 1998; Gomes-Casseres 1996;
Hagedoorn and Schakenraad 1992; Mytelka 1991). It is also a sector with
a diverse population of companies such as diversiﬁed companies, special-
ized suppliers, new entrants and ‘older’ established companies (Duysters
1996; Duysters and Hagedoorn 1995; Gartner Group 1994).
Dependent Variable
In this study, technological performance is measured by taking the 1993
patent intensity of companies, i.e. the number of computer patents divided
by the size (computer revenues) of the company, as the innovative output
indicator. As with so many other measures, this patent indicator is subject
to a debate regarding its usefulness (Cohen and Levin 1989; Griliches 1990;
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tors that enables us to compare the technological performance and techno-
logical learning of companies (Acs and Audretsch 1989; Aspden 1983;
Cantwell and Hodson 1991; Patel and Pavitt 1991, 1995; Pavitt 1988). It
is important to note that the dependent variable measures the technologi-
cal capabilities and performance of individual companies that are affected,
amongst other things, by strategic technology alliances. This indicator does
not measure joint patenting activities, as it reﬂects the technological per-
formance of each individual company in the population. As such, this indi-
cator is particularly relevant for our study of the networks of strategic
technology alliances which can be expected to inﬂuence the technological
learning capabilities of companies. See also Powell and Brantley (1992),
who describe patents as ‘signals’ of technological competencies and learn-
ing capabilities of companies in inter-ﬁrm networks.
Network Measures and Variables
As mentioned in the above, strategic technology alliances between com-
panies are taken as the measure of ties in our analysis. These ties are sym-
metric. To account for repeated ties, multiple, separate alliances between
the same partners are counted separately. Networks of these ties are mea-
sured for the complete period of the analysis (1986-1992). The main indi-
cators of a particular network behaviour are standard network measures,
such as density, bridge ties, structural equivalence, and status. In other
words, we stay as close as possible to conventional network analysis. See
also Appendix 1 for additional information on these measures.
The variable measuring multiple contacts concerns the number of contacts
with the same partners. From a learning perspective, having multiple links
with a variety of partners increases the probability that companies will
develop new capabilities. From a traditional network analysis perspective,
however, having multiple links with the same partners is of little relevance,
if not inefﬁcient. For this measure (‘multiple contacts’), we divide the
degree centrality (CD) of a ﬁrm by the number of its partners to express
this relative redundancy. The degree centrality (CD) is a rather straightfor-
ward measure of centrality, which is equal to the total number of direct
links of that particular player to all the other players. 
The maintenance of bridge ties, that overarch structural holes with as lit-
tle redundancy as possible, is measured by means of two indicators:
betweenness centrality (CB) and degree centrality (CD). The importance of
bridge ties as such is measured by the betweenness centrality (CB).
Betweenness refers to the number of times a player is located on the short-
est geodesic path between two other players. The expression geodesic path
is used to denote the shortest path between two points in the network. If a
certain player is directly linked to two other players who are not directly
linked to each other, then the ﬁrst actor is said to be ‘between’ the other
players. In an information network, a company that has a high degree of
betweenness centrality has the potential to control the ﬂows of information
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1982). From an efﬁciency perspective, the number of bridge ties is more
important than the total number of links at a ﬁrm’s disposal. Therefore, we
divided the betweenness centrality (CB) by the degree centrality (CD) to
arrive at a relative measure (‘bridges’).
The structural equivalence of ﬁrms measures the degree of interaction with
the same players. Firms are referred to as a structural equivalent if they
have identical ties to all other ﬁrms in the network (‘structural equiva-
lence’). According to Burt (1992a), the lower the number of structural
equivalent ﬁrms that a company faces, the more effective a ﬁrm’s network
behaviour will be. In this paper, we use a standard structural equivalence
measure of the number of identical contacts. Following Wasserman and
Faust (1994) we assume that there will be no loss of information by com-
bining the two (or more) structurally equivalent actors into a single subset.
Network status is deﬁned as the degree to which a company has alliances
with powerful companies in terms of their network position, indicated by
the Bonacich eigenvalue centrality measure (CE) (Bonacich 1972). In this
measure, the centrality of each ﬁrm is determined by the centrality of the
ﬁrms to which it is connected (Borgatti et al. 1992). The normalized eigen-
vector that is used in our study is calculated as the scaled eigenvalue cen-
trality divided by the maximum possible difference. A high score on this
variable (‘network status’) means that a company is associated with a rel-
atively large number of powerful partners in terms of their centrality in the
network. This seems to be particularly important for an efﬁciency per-
spective.
Table 1 presents an overview of the expected relationship between each of
these variables regarding network efﬁciency and the technological perfor-
mance of companies. In the statistical analysis, given the way they are oper-
ationalized and measured, we expect two efﬁciency variables (‘bridges’and
‘structural equivalence’) to be negatively related to performance, when
viewed from an efﬁciency perspective. It should be clear that this negative
relationship is due to the speciﬁcs of the measurement of these variables.
The assumed negative relationship does not indicate a normative appreci-
ation. To help arrange the material clearly, we designed these variables in
such a way that, for an efﬁciency strategy, the expected sign in the analy-
sis would be negative, due to the conversion of values. 
For efﬁciency-based behaviour, ‘network status’is expected to be positively
related to performance. ‘Multiple contacts’ is irrelevant from an efﬁciency
perspective, whereas, from a learning perspective, this variable is expected















Multiple contacts Irrelevant Positive*
Bridges Negative* Irrelevant
Structural equivalence Negative* Irrelevant
Network status Positive* Irrelevant
* negative and positive effects refer primarily to the expected non-normative, statistical
relationships.to be the network variable that is positively related to performance. From
the perspective of learning behaviour, the effects of the other variables are
predicted to be statistically irrelevant.
Control Variables
Apart from these network variables, we expect the size of companies
to have an effect on their patent activity. In the classical Schumpeterian
argument, the patent activity of companies — an indicator of their
technological performance — increases more than proportionally with ﬁrm
size. The main arguments are: the growing importance of science-based
industries, innovation as a major source of competition, and economies of
scale and scope. The classical counter-argument is provided by Bain (1956),
who stated that small companies are more innovation-efﬁcient, whereas
larger ﬁrms suffer from ‘creative backwardness’. Scherer’s (1965 and
1984a) view is also widely accepted, i.e. that the patent activity of com-
panies tends to rise less than proportionally, once a certain threshold has
been passed. Empirical studies by Mansﬁeld (1984) and Mueller (1986)
support this view of non-linearity. See also Cohen and Levin (1989) for a
review of the literature on the effect of company size on their innovative
output.
The size of companies is measured by taking the average sector-speciﬁc
(i.e. computer) revenues of companies (Size). As we take the natural log-
arithm of size, we also take into account, as suggested by the literature, the
diminishing effect of size on patenting activity.
The R&D activity of companies — the ratio of computer-related R&D
spending to computer revenues — is taken as a second control variable
(‘R&D intensity’). We expect an effect of R&D on patent activity as
research efforts will (at least partly) be transformed into patents. Also, inter-
nal R&D is important, as it can be seen as the ‘ticket of admission to an
information network’ (Mowery and Rosenberg 1989), and, as such, it is
expected to affect both the network properties of companies and their learn-
ing through alliances (Mowery and Rosenberg 1989; Powell and Brantley
1992).
The relation between R&D and patents has been studied extensively. In
Kamien and Schwartz’ (1982) well-known survey, it is stated that ‘... with-
out much doubt, on average, a direct relation between innovational effort
and innovational output exists’(Kamien and Schwartz 1982: 57). However,
it is added that other factors can inﬂuence the transformation, so that the
relation may not be linear. In studies by Bound et al. (1984), Scherer
(1984a), and Hausman et al. (1984), it is mentioned that patenting output
decreases gradually with an increase of R&D expenditures. By using the
ratio of R&D expenditures to the logarithm of size, we take this decreas-
ing effect into account.
Finally, given the technological leadership of US companies in the inter-
national computer industry, we include a US dummy as a dichotomous
control variable.
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Data for the size of companies and their R&D expenditures is taken from
the Gartner Group’s annual Yardstick: the top 100 computer hardware com-
panies, worldwide, that published data up to 1992. The Yardstick, Top-100
Worldwide was an authoritative statistical review of the computer industry.
Data in the Yardstick was updated annually through surveys and research
by Gartner Group consultants and analysts. The Yardstick contains calen-
dar year information, as opposed to information based upon ﬁscal years,
which allows us to make better comparisons between companies. The
Gartner group (1994) estimates that their sample of the leading 100 com-
puter companies accounts for over 90 percent of the worldwide market.
The ﬁrms in our sample cover more than 90 percent of the revenues pre-
sented in the Gartner Group sample. This implies that our sample accounts
for more than 80 percent of the total computer industry.
The data on patents for the dependent variable (technological performance)
was taken from the US Patent and Trademark Ofﬁce database (US
Department of Commerce). We took the number of patents in the SIC code
357 (computer and ofﬁce equipment) for which ﬁrms had applied, which
not only covers computers in a narrow sense, but also includes peripheral
equipment, such as storage devices and terminals. Although this US data
could imply a bias in favour of US companies and against non-US ﬁrms,
the group of non-US companies in this study represents a group of innov-
ative and rather large ﬁrms that are known to have taken out patents, world-
wide. Furthermore, the innovation literature suggests several other reasons
for using ‘taking out US patents’as an indicator. Frequently mentioned rea-
sons are the importance of the US market, the ‘real’ patent protection
offered by US authorities, and the level of technological sophistication of
the US market, which makes it almost compulsory for non-US companies
to ﬁle patents in the United States. See Patel and Pavitt (1991) for a dis-
cussion on the use of US patent data.
The data on strategic technology alliances was obtained from the 
MERIT-CATI data bank on cooperative technology agreements. The most
important data sources for this databank are a large number of inter-
national and specialized trade and technology journals for each sector and
for many ﬁelds of technology. The database contains information on
each cooperative agreement and some information on companies partici-
pating in these agreements. Cooperative agreements are deﬁned as the
establishment of common interests between independent (industrial)
partner, i.e. partners who are not connected through (majority) owner-
ship. The transfer of technology or the undertaking of joint research is
considered to be crucial for these arrangements. Strategic technology
alliances take the form of contractual agreements (such as R&D pacts)
or equity joint ventures. For the purpose of the present analysis, informa-
tion is used regarding the industrial sectors and ﬁelds of technology and
the year of establishment of the strategic technology alliances. Additional
information on this data bank can be found in Hagedoorn (1993) and
536 John Hagedoom, Geert DuystersHagedoorn and Schakenraad (1994), or it can be obtained from the
authors.
Data for the independent variables in the analysis covers a 7-year period
(1986-1992), during which the number of annually made alliances was
growing at an unprecedented rate (Hagedoorn 1996). This development led
to a large number of alliances forming a population of sufﬁcient size. The
population of alliances in the analysis is based on the total number of
alliances of companies in the computer industry established during the
period 1986-1992.
For the dependent variable, we take its value in 1993. This implies that we
introduce a time lag, of, on average, four years, for the joint innovative
input, such as joint R&D projects, to materialize into innovative output,
i.e. patents. Research on such time lags (Scherer 1984b; Pakes and Griliches
1984) suggests that, on average, an invention leads to patents after about
two and a half years, although there is substantial variation. If we include
the process of R&D itself, and the additional time that joint projects can
be expected to take, then an average time lag of four years appears to be
a valid estimate.
As companies are the major carriers of technological change in this net-
work environment, the dynamics of the environment do not only reﬂect
structural changes in the market, but also technological changes that come
with the entry of new players into the network and into the industrial envi-
ronment. Many of these new players are relatively small and ‘unknown’
ﬁrms, or diversiﬁed companies that have a major interest in other indus-
tries. This particular aspect of a dynamic environment is relevant in the
current context, because 64 percent of the 88 companies in the analysis
entered the overall network during the second half of the period (1989-
1992). See Appendix 2 for the list of companies.
Finally, there are several reasons why we chose to analyze one particular
population of companies, instead of comparing different sectors. First, the
objective of this exercise is to compare efﬁciency and learning behaviour
under conditions brought about by a dynamic network environment. Second,
within one particular network environment, we can control for a large num-
ber of industry effects, such as differences in economies of scale and
economies of scope, alternating business-cycle effects and differences in the
propensity to patent. In particular, the differences in propensity to patent is
crucial. If we were to undertake an analysis in which we compared different
networking strategies in, for example, a dynamic and a static environment,
using patents as an indicator of technological performance, the comparison
would be troublesome. In the MERIT-CATI data set, sectors such as the steel
industry and the auto industry would qualify as mature, static environments
with a large enough number of strategic technology alliances with a stable
number of partnering companies. However, previous research (e.g. Arundel
and Kabla 1998; Mansﬁeld 1986) indicates that patents are poor indicators
of technological performance in these industries, making the exercise rather
useless.Third, by concentrating on one network environment, we follow the
example of many recent empirical network analyses (Duysters and
Learning in Dynamic Inter-ﬁrm Networks 537Vanhaverbeke 1996; Human and Provan 1997; Powell et al. 1996; Walker et
al. 1997; Zaheer and Zaheer 1997), that each of them studies a particular sec-
tor or a speciﬁc network of companies.
Results 
To measure the effect of different kinds of network behaviour, we apply
standard ordinary least square regression. Table 2 lists the mean and stan-
dard deviations for the variables in the analysis. In order to detect possi-
ble multicollinearity, we not only analyzed the correlation between the
variables (see Table 3), but also regressed each independent variable on all
the other independent variables. This method is often described as the most
preferred method of assessing multicollinearity (see Lewis-Beck 1993). The
advantage over the frequent practice of examining bivariate correlations
among the independent variables is that it takes into account the relation-
ship between all independent variables and an independent variable. As
noted in Lewis-Beck (1993: 52) ‘... it is possible, for instance, to ﬁnd no
large bivariate correlations, although one of the independent variables is a
nearly perfect linear combination of the remaining independent variables
...’. This test showed that no signiﬁcant multicollinearity was detected, as
none of the other regressions used for checking multicollinearity in the
analysis produces R2 s above 0.7. R2s close to 1.0 are considered to reveal
a high degree of multicollinearity (Lewis-Beck 1993).
Table 4 presents the analysis for this population of computer companies.
According to the F value and the R2 value, the model is signiﬁcant. All













Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Multiple contacts 0.3711 0.8929
Bridges 0.5010 0.3538
Structural Equivalence 0.8714 0.2970
Network status 5.8327 12.1543
Size 13.7028 1.3022
US dummy 0.6591 0.4767
R&D intensity 0.0717 0.0404
Table 3 Pearson Correlation Coefﬁcients  (n = 88)
Multiple Bridges Structural Network Size US R&D
Contacts Equivalence Status Dummy Intensity
Multiple contacts 1.000
Bridges –0.036 1.000
Structural equivalence –0.066 0.170 1.000
Network status 0.462** –0.132 0.057 1.000
Size 0.234* 0.138 0.066 0.440** 1.000
US dummy –0.161 –0.023 –0.072 –0.026 –0.352** 1.000
R&D intensity 0.295** –0.167 –0.071 0.228* 0.198 0.124 1.000
* Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)     ** Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) variables that would support an efﬁciency perspective are insigniﬁcant,
which supports Hypothesis 2. As predicted by Hypothesis 1, the only impor-
tant variable from a learning perspective, ‘multiple contacts’, has a posi-
tive effect and is highly signiﬁcant. 
The control variables (size, R&D intensity and the dummy for US com-
panies) appear to have no signiﬁcant impact on the patent intensity of these
computer companies. The (insigniﬁcant) negative effect of size that was
measured appears to support some research in the neo-Schumpeterian tra-
dition, as mentioned above. The same applies to the insigniﬁcant effect of
R&D intensity on technological performance. The results for both these
variables suggest a possible non-linear relationship between size, R&D
intensity and patent output. 
We also undertook several additional analyses. First, we looked separately
at contractual agreements to see whether the form of organization of an
alliance might have an effect on our ﬁndings. This exercise generated
results similar to those obtained for the general population of strategic
technology alliances. As such, this is not so surprising, because contractual
agreements account for over 75 percent of these alliances (Hagedoorn
1996). Given the small number of equity joint ventures in the sample,
it was not possible to run the analysis, also for this particular form of
partnering.
Second, we also weighted the age of the alliances in the analysis, assum-
ing that, for example, 7-year old alliances from 1986 might have had a
smaller effect on the technological performance of companies in 1993, than
alliances that were only two or three years old. This correction for the
weight of alliances turned out to have no effect. This can be explained by
the fact that the growth of newly made alliances during the early nineties
was at least twice as high as that during the mid-eighties. This growth pat-
tern, with a large presence of later alliances, dominates any exercise that
considers correcting for the age of strategic technology alliances.
Third, we also considered the possible interaction effects between multiple
contacts (relevant for a learning perspective) and the other three network
variables (relevant for an efﬁciency perspective) on the dependent variable.
However, none of these interactions had a signiﬁcant effect on the techno-
logical performance of companies. 













Multiple contacts 0.582 3.22*
Bridges –0.050 –0.31
Structural equivalence 0.106 0.68
Network status 0.167 0.85
Size –0.095 –0.50
US dummy –0.140 –0.02
R&D intensity –0.004 –0.81
* p < 0.01 ; R2 = 0.47 Adj R2= 0.31
Std Er = 0.026 F = 2.95 Sign. F = 0.023Discussion and Conclusions
Our ﬁndings suggest a number of important implications for understand-
ing different forms of network rationality in a dynamic network environ-
ment. In such an environment, a network rationality based on learning-based
behaviour seems to become important, as indicated by the effect of this
behaviour on the higher technological performance of companies. A
dynamic environment, characterized by market structural changes that
accompany technological development, appears to induce companies to
learn as much as possible from a number of ‘trusted’ sources. With this
learning-based behaviour, companies do not necessarily maximize their
linkages in terms of being most effective in producing results with little
waste of effort. Given the unstable environment they are facing, compa-
nies appear to concentrate much more on achieving the desired results as
such. As for networks of strategic technology alliances, these desired results
are given in terms of technological performance, for which learning as much
as possible, even through multiplication of contacts, appears to yield pos-
itive results. The multiplication of contacts between the same companies
will usually take place over a period of a number of years. Therefore, our
ﬁndings also support earlier research that stresses the relevance, for under-
standing networks, of looking at the history of partnerships between com-
panies, see Gulati (1995a, b).
Our ﬁndings complement the recent research of Walker et al. (1997) who
conclude that contributions such as Burt (1992a) are probably most rele-
vant in the context of analyzing networks of standard market transactions.
Walker et al. (1997) apply the concept of social capital to develop their
understanding of the durability of embedded networks of cooperating ﬁrms;
networks that, nevertheless, allow the entry of new players. Although there
are differences from a learning perspective, the results regarding the impor-
tance of both of them increasing relationships in another dynamic envi-
ronment (biotechnology) are quite similar to our ﬁndings.
It is also important to note that our analysis does not reject the idea that
efﬁciency behaviour in building a network of strategic technology alli-
ances could still be instrumental for companies, if they want to learn
from partners in a static environment. Then, efﬁciency, in terms of con-
centrating both on alliances with primary contacts and with companies
that have higher network status, while overarching structural holes with
as little redundancy as possible, could generate signiﬁcantly higher per-
formance for companies that follow such a policy. To put it differently, it
is still possible that in a static environment, higher company performance
will be associated with efﬁcient network positioning, in the sense that there
is non-redundancy and higher selectivity in contacts with other companies.
However, as mentioned in the above, there are some serious methodo-
logical problems in comparing network strategies and technological per-
formance in a dynamic network environment with a static environment,
using the same measure for technological performance. Our current analy-
sis is limited to one network environment and we can only speculate
540 John Hagedoom, Geert Duystersabout the possible relevance of efﬁciency behaviour in a static network
environment. 
The distinction between efﬁciency and learning-based behaviour in the
context of networking can also be linked to a further reﬁnement of differ-
ent forms of learning, such as explorative and exploitative learning.
Exploratory learning or non-routinized learning involves changes in com-
pany routines and experimentation with new alternatives (see, e.g., Dodgson
1993; March 1991), which, if successful, does change the nature of com-
pany competencies and increases their innovative performance. In a
dynamic environment, with changes in both players and technologies,
exploratory learning becomes important, not only in terms of the endoge-
nous capabilities of companies, but also in terms of learning, when the rel-
evance of the knowledge of partners is unclear in advance. Under these
circumstances, dense patterns of interaction, with repeated contacts and
continuous ﬂows of information, as in exploratory learning-based networks,
start to count. Exploitative learning, on the other hand, is characterized as
routinized learning which only adds to the existing knowledge and com-
petencies of a ﬁrm, without changing the nature of its activities. This could
suggest that, if companies build networks in a static context, in which they
have accurate information about the existing capabilities of their network
linkages, they can add capabilities to their own performance, but the
improvement will be in line which what could be expected. Hence, efﬁ-
ciency or exploitative network behaviour can still be beneﬁcial in a static
environment. 
As far as network status, in terms of existing network power, is concerned,
our research suggests that this aspect of network performance is not very
relevant in a dynamic environment. From a learning perspective, it can be
argued that status derived from existing network positioning is probably
not so germane in a dynamic context. Having repeated ties with a group
of companies, including those companies that still have to demonstrate their
value, probably has a higher learning potential than linking up to compa-
nies that are well established in terms of being connected to other, histor-
ically, powerful companies.
Finally, it is obvious that the current analysis has its limitations in terms
of the degree to which we can generalize its outcomes, in particular to sta-
tic environments. However, the results for this particular dynamic industry
are quite signiﬁcant, not only statistically, but also because we study a large
and important network environment. Future studies of other networks might
provide further insight into the rationality that lies behind both efﬁciency
and exploitative forms of network strategies, as well as exploratory and
learning strategies. The current contribution already strongly suggests that
alternative forms of networking behaviour and network conﬁgurations,
based on different perceptions of rational behaviour and learning, can
also generate different results in terms of the technological performance of
companies.
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Brief Technical Description of Standard Network Measures
Degree centrality:
a(Pi,PK) =1 if Pi and PK are connected directly, and 0 otherwise.
Betweeness centrality:
n represents the number of points in the network, gij represents the number of geodesic
paths linking pi and pj that contain pk.
Structural equivalence:
Given an adjacency matrix, or a set of adjacency matrices for different relations, a cor-
relation matrix can be formed by the following procedure. A proﬁle vector is formed
for a vertex i by concatenating the ith row in every adjacency matrix. The i,jth element
of the correlation matrix is the Pearson correlation coefﬁcient of the proﬁle vectors of
i and j. This (square, symmetric) matrix is called the ﬁrst correlation matrix. 
The procedure can be performed iteratively on the correlation matrix until convergence
takes place. Each entry is now 1 or –1. This matrix is used to split the data into two
blocks, such that members of the same blocks are positively correlated, and members
of different blocks are negatively correlated.
CONCOR, a widely applied block modelling algorithm, uses the technique mentioned
above to split the initial data into two blocks. Successive splits are then applied to the
separate blocks. At each iteration, all blocks are submitted to the analysis. However,
blocks containing two vertices are not split. Consequently n-partitions of the binary tree
can produce up to 2n blocks (see Borgatti et al. 1992).
Network status indicated by a normalized eigenvector:
Given an adjacency matrix A,  the centrality of vertex i  (denoted  ci) is given by
ci = α∑Aijcj where α is a parameter. The centrality of each vertex is therefore deter-
mined by the centrality of the vertices to which it is connected. The parameter α is
required to give the equations a non-trivial solution and is therefore the reciprocal of
an eigenvalue. The normalized eigenvector centrality is the scaled eigenvector central-
ity divided by the maximum difference, expressed as a percentage (see Borgatti et al.
1992).
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List of 88 Companies in the Network Analysis of the International
Computer Industry 
* marks a company that was already active in the network during the period 1986–1988. 
* The US National Science Foundation funded this research in part. Portions of this study
were undertaken when Hagedoorn was a visiting scholar at the Center for Economic Policy
Research at Stanford University and the Haas School of Business of the University of
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